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Why Free Capital Mobility may be Hazardous to
       Your Health: Lessons from the Latest
        Financial Crisis
                 By
     Jagdish Bhagwati
These remarks were prepared for the NBER Conference on Capital Controls in Cambridge,
Mass., November 7, 1998. For the video recording, I have omitted the sentences which are
italicised.
Since I am unable to return from Chile in time for this Conference, Marty has asked me to
put on video my views on Free Capital Mobility (FCM), i.e. on full-blooded capital account
convertibility, as expressed originally in my May 1998 Foreign Affairs article.
Presumably, this is because the article has attracted an inordinate amount of attention. I
am told by the Foreign Affairs editors, who provocatively titled it The Capital Myth, that it is
possibly the most reprinted and translated economics article in their magazine in recent years. I
also notice that, in the latest issue, almost 8 months after mine appeared, the IMF has gotten its
External Publicity Director, Shailen Anjaraia, to write a rather feeble 2-page riposte: a sure
sign that the IMF regards the article as particularly potent in view of its being cited by all sorts
of G-somethings that are part of the IMF’s  clients and patrons!
I guess my views concerning the acute problems raised by FCM, and the contrast I raised
with Free Trade (FT) which is free from these problems, are not particularly bizarre or off the
curve. Indeed, I have held these “asymmetric” views about FCM and FT for as long as I
remember. Indeed, they were expressed, by reference to Chilean experience, in the Report on
India’s Economic Reforms that I and T.N.Srinivasan prepared for the reformist Indian Finance
Minister in 1992-93. But somehow, the public expects that if you are for one sort of
Globalization, you must logically be for another: that Free Trade, Free DFI, Free Capital Flows,
Free Immigration, Free Love, Free…whatever should go together! Well, they are wrong.
But this unwarranted link between FT and FCM is a major source of problems for FT
today, as I discover in increasing numbers of debates with FT’s opponents such as Ralph Nader
just a few weeks ago at Cornell: the sins of FCM are visited on the virtues of FT. E en Dani
Rodrik, one of us, in a recent TNR essay, seems to draw sustenance illogically from the social
consequences of the financial crisis to condemn the “myths and half truths” of FT and for an
alleged disregard of the social consequences of FT (which is another matter altogether). And, so
FCM has imperiled the cause of FT in an insidious but potent fashion.
So, the issue of FCM is of great importance. But if I argue that FT and FCM are
asymmetric, it does not follow that I am all for capital controls either. I shall take the opportunity
provided by Marty therefore to recap and explain my position through a succession of Six
Propositions (which I spell out somewhat fully).
Proposition 1: The case for FT is different from the case for FCM: there are similarities but
there are also important differences. Specifically, capital flows are subject to what Kindl berger
has famously called Panics, Manias and Crashes. In theoretical terms, we would say that
destabilizing speculation can, and does, break out where the speculators can emerge unscathed
even when they are betting against fundamentals because these fundamentals shift as a result of
the speculation, validating the speculation. [The original Friedman argument that destabilizing
speculation would punish the speculators is therefore not correct. The first known argument to
that effect, I believe, is by Triffin, then by Aliber, and later the argument has been formalized by
a number of theorists, principally Maurice Obstfeld, who naturally show that multiple equilibria
can obtain in this game.]
No one of sound mind can seriously sustain the notion that either trade in goods and
services leads to such problems or we have the macroeconomic expertise, indeed the alchemy, to
eliminate this important, inherent downside of free capital flows.
Proposition 2: Therefore, this downside of FCM must be put against the upside of FCM. The
upside consists, of course, of  two important and well-known arguments: (1) freedom to buy and
sell, as also to move capital, is a value in itself (but, of course, it does not follow that, like the
freedom to shout “fire”, it must necessarily be left unregulated and unconstrained if the
consequences are immensely harmful to society at large); and (2) any time you free up a market,
there is a presumption of deadweight gain in efficiency.
But two qualifiers must be added. First, Richard Cooper has argued that , drawing on the
celebrated Brecher-Alejandro argument, free capital flows in the presence of trade distortions can
be immiserizing (or, at least, would have less than apparent value). There are, of course, still
many tariffs in place around the world. So, Cooper’s caveat certainly has some relevance. I
would draw from it the policy judgment, not that FCM is bad, but that it must be preceded by
substantial trade openness. I return to this later, arguing that it is better to have many developing
countries not yet on FCM to concentrate their energies instead on pushing further towards FT.
Second, as I said in the May 1998 essay, the gains to developing countries from capital
inflow, and more, can be obtained by encouraging the inflow of DFI which also brings in skills
and technology, and is pretty much regarded today, and properly so, as a source of mutual
advantage, like FT. DFI can be attracted by granting convertibility to the firm’s earnings and
capital; this is a much restricted and targeted form of capital account convertibility which does
not extend to the ability of nationals and non-nationals to take capital out of a country in any
magnitude, or letting firms and banks borrow short-term capital freely, precipitating and
intensifying crises. True, if you had the latter, i.e. full convertibility, perhaps there might be more
DFI; I doubt, however, that this loss is large.
Proposition 3: The gains from FCM, measured at “crisis-free” value, must in any event be set
against the expected value of losses during a crisis. The latter obviously reflects the probability of
a crisis setting in and the expected value of the losses during the crisis.
Proposition 4:  (1) What then can we say about the “crisis-free” gains? Here, I am afraid that we
have really do not have, to my knowledge, any studies that suggest that the gains from FCM are
“mammoth” as Bradford deLong has argued. I am not suggesting that capital flows, per se, could
not have a beneficial effect, ceteris paribus. But even this likely outcome has to be discounted by
the fact that inflowing capital may well be put to bad use: a possibility that may be linked to the
fact that short-term inflows tend to increase sharply in the presence of unsustainable asset price
booms.
Also, the question before us is really not whether capital inflows are productive, but
rather whether FCM, i.e. capital account convertibility, is associated with rapid growth and
prosperity. Here, surely the answer is even tougher to provide. We have had hugely successful
economic growth in China and Japan, for instance, without FCM. Dani Rodrik has bravely tried
to look at the empirical issue by using multi-country regressions and finds no relationship
between capital account convertibility and growth. While I must confess to a prejudice that I find
this kind of analysis too unsubtle to have much value --- I talk about “endless” regressions
whereas Bob Solow is more frontal and calls them “mindless” regressions --- , it may
nonetheless be used as one more reason to look some of the more extravagant claims regarding
the gains from FCM in the eye.
(2) Reinforcing this skepticism about “mammoth” gains from FCM, we would have to
reckon also with the fact that, as the latest Asian crisis demonstrates, the probability of being hit
by a crisis (once you have FCM and hence the possibility of excessive short-term exposure and
associated possibility of herd-behaviour-driven panics for instance) is not exactly “low”.
Until we have had the new Bretton Woods conference everyone is talking about, and we
have decided what is the new international architecture that we are going to have, it is not even
clear that much can be done to effectively reduce the probability of being hit by the crises and to
increase the efficacy of dealing with them adequately when they arise. The latest IMF/World
Bank meetings revealed how much we need to know what the right solutions are and (sadly) how
little we know what they are!
Proposition 5: Add to all this the fact that the IMF can, and indeed did in the current Asian
crisis, get its conditionality badly wrong as well. I am persuaded by Sachs & Radelet’
arguments, and by a recent brilliant essay by Max Corden, that the IMF should not have gone in
for deflationary policies but should have instead undertaken a Keynesian-style reflationary policy
to offset the initial and induced deflationary effect of the capital outflow. True, ne can make
several arguments for what the IMF did; and it is inherent in the macroeconomic game that the
assumptions one makes about responses of agents to policies may turn out to be either wrongly
signed or badly off on the parameters. But the fact is that the IMF did get things wrong,
according to even impartial observers who have nothing against the IMF and do not proceed on
the assumption that whatever the IMF does, the opposite must be the right policy.
So, when the crisis hits, you are not even sure that it will not be compounded, instead of
being eased, by those whose job it is to assist you! So, that increases yet further the likelihood of
significant costs from the crisis when it hits you.
But these are only the economic and social disruptions that can get you politically. What
happens when the IMF starts telling you to change your “structural” policies which have little to
do with the crisis at hand, or else?  When you look at the c nditionalities imposed on Indonesia
and South Korea, for instance, you cannot but raise this question. Marty F ldstein, in his Foreign
Affairs article, also greatly influential, raised this question trenchantly. And I agree with his view
that this was an unwelcome development. Besides, how does one know that the IMF’s judgments
about structure were correct, being given to countries whose track record on growth has been so
substantial that it has been described correctly as a “miracle”! It needed chutzpah, or deep
concession to Washington’s  longstanding demands to remake Asia in its own image, to ask for
these kinds of changes. As Marty has noted, these are questions to be decided by sovereign
nations. In short, to the immediate economic costs of  wrongheaded early IMF conditionality, we
must add the political costs of  unjustified loss of sovereignty and even the longterm costs of
possibly ill-advised and politically-driven demands for changed policies in place of ones that
these afflicted nations preferred and may well have aided in producing their high growth rates.
In addition, I must note specifically, as many have, that the IMF’s and Treasury’s
continuous hammering of the theme that these countries were characterised by “crony
capitalism”, “corruption”, “inefficient” policies, and every other sin in the Book of Virtue, to the
exclusion of the role played by what I have called the Wall Street-Treasury  Complex (in a non-
conspiratorial sense), was a self-serving analysis. This only aggravated the panic that started and
fueled the crisis; it was thus not merely wrongheaded but also accentuated the problems both for
the afflicted countries and, in turn, for the IMF itself.
Proposition 6: So, if we are to draw any lessons concerning FCM at the present time, I would
make the following two observations:
First, there are many developing countries which are still not on FCM. The IMF, and
indeed the Wall Street-Treasury Complex, had been pushing aggressively for greater shift to
FCM. True, the IMF’s splendid economists cannot have been unaware of the reasons to go easy
on this; but the political pressures and the euphoria were huge enough to make even the IMF
drop its guard de facto. I believe that there is now more prudence on this question.
So, for these countries, for whom the question is not one of adopting capital controls but of
dropping them, I would say:  “Cease and desist from moving rapidly to FCM until you have
gained political stability, economic prosperity and substantial macroeconomic expertise --- and
not just “transparency” and better banking supervision. Concentrate instead on freeing external
trade barriers and implementing internal reforms such as privatization.”
Second, for the few developing countries that had embraced FCM more or less, and
which have run into the current and the earlier crises, the question is rather different: should they,
like Malaysia, make a 180 degree turn and abandon FCM for a slew of capital controls?
Here, I incline to an asymmetric answer from that to the preceding question. Using an analogy, I
would say that if you have joined the Mafia, you do not go up to Mr.Gambin  and just tell him
that you are leaving; if you do, you will leave in a coffin. What you do instead is to call up the
FBI, get into the witness protection program, and so on. Similarly, the countries already in the
FCM game must exercise caution instead of making a u-turn precipitously to capital controls.
More specifically, I would distinguish among 3 groups of countries.
(i) Once you have been on FCM more or less, and you experience reversal of capital
inflow of the order that added up to over 10% of GNP for the five afflicted Asian countries, the
main problem surely has to be: how do you get some or most of this capital back in order to ease
the inevitably serious problems caused by this huge loss of resources. [If I call orrectly, the
income loss imposed by the oil price increases of 1971 and 1973 on OECD countries was of the
order of 3% of GNP and was sufficient to unsettle these advanced countries’ macroeconomics
almost through the 1970s.]
So, restoring confidence is essential. Capitl controls, especially in a sharp turn, surely
cannot provide, and will only undermine further, that confidence in my view. True, as Krugman
has reminded the advocates of such a policy, you can lower interest rates with controls and then
revive the economy. But, if the diffidence has worsened, who will borrow to invest? I therefore
think that Malaysia’s option should have been to stay the course and to work with a chastened
IMF which has reversed course and begun to back reflationary policies in the region. And I
would advocate the same for all those who are already in the game of FCM in a significant
degree and have gotten into trouble.
(ii) For the countries on FCM that have fortunately not gotten into trouble because they
were prudential and watched their short-term debt exposure andregulated it Chilean style as
called for, my advice : stay the course and continue doing more of the same.
(iii) And for those countries on FCM that have unwittingly managed to avoid getting
short-term flows in any significant degree, the best policy advice is to be prudent for the future:
introduce monitoring and review of future inflows, while keeping Chilean style control
mechanisms in place for use as n cessary.
